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AT SUNNYL ANDS
 THE ANNENBERG RETREAT
Nearly a decade after the 9/11 Commission
issued its report on the greatest act of terrorism
on U.S. soil, one of its most significant
 recommendations has not been acted upon.
The call for consolidated Congressional
oversight of the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) is, in the words of
Commission co-chair Thomas H. Kean,
“maybe the toughest recommendation”
because Congress does not usually reform
itself. 
To underscore the importance of this
reform, The Annenberg Foundation Trust at
Sunnylands and the Aspen Institute’s Justice
and Society Program convened a task force
in April 2013, including 9/11 Commission co-
chairs Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, former
DHS officials under Presidents Barack
Obama and George W. Bush, and members
of Congress (Appendix). While the failure to
reform DHS oversight may be invisible to the
public, it is not without consequence or risk.
Fragmented jurisdiction impedes DHS’  ability
to deal with three major vulnerabilities: the
threats posed by small aircraft and boats;
cyberattacks; and biological weapons.
“I think we’ve been distinctly less secure
from a biological or chemical attack than we
would have been had we had a more rational
and targeted program of identifying the most
serious threats,” said former Sen. Bob
Graham (D., Fla.). As the 9/11 Commission
Report noted: “So long as oversight is
 governed by current Congressional rules and
resolutions, we believe that the American
people will not get the security they want and
need.”
Earlier work by policy groups such as the
Heritage Foundation and Brookings
Institution attests to the consensus that
 consolidated oversight of DHS is needed.
Among the concerns: More than 100
Congressional committees and subcommittees
claim jurisdiction over it. In 2009, the
 department spent the equivalent of 66 work-
years responding to Congressional inquiries.
Moreover, the messages regarding homeland
security that come out of Congress sometimes
appear to conflict or are drowned out
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Executive Summary
Congressional leaders are best able to judge what committee should have
jurisdiction over this department and its duties. But we believe that Congress
does have the obligation to choose one in the House and one in the Senate,
and that this committee should be a permanent standing committee with a
nonpartisan staff. 
—9/11 Commission Report
 altogether. As former DHS Secretary Michael
Chertoff noted, “When many voices speak,
it’s like no voice speaks.”
The task force recommends that:
 DHS should have an oversight
 structure that resembles the one governing
other critical departments, such as Defense
and Justice.
 Committees claiming jurisdiction over
DHS should have overlapping membership.
Since a new committee structure cannot
be implemented until the 114th Congress is
seated in 2015, the task force also
 recommends these interim steps toward
more focused oversight: 
 Time-limiting subcommittee referrals
to expedite matters of national security.
 Passing, for the first time since
 formation of the department in 2002, an
authorization bill for DHS, giving the department
clear direction from Congress.
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In 2002, the federal government’s third-
largest department, the Department of
Homeland Security, was created by putting
under one umbrella 22 departments and
agencies, from the Coast Guard in the
Department of Transportation to the Border
Patrol in the Department of Justice to the  
U.S. Secret Service in the Treasury
Department. In July 2004, the 9/11
Commission issued 41 recommendations,
including one that the Commission itself
noted was among “the most important” but
also “the most difficult to realize” — reform of
Congressional oversight of the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In
the words of Commission co-chair Thomas H.
Kean, “We had a number of members of the
commission like [co-chair and former Rep.
Lee H.] Hamilton who had served in the body,
and they all said the same thing: This may be
the toughest recommendation” because
Congress doesn’t usually reform itself.1
The recommendation of the 9/11
Commission addressed problems that had
contributed to the United States’ vulnerability
to attack on 9/11. Former Sen. Bob Graham
(D., Fla.), co-chairman of the Senate
Intelligence Committee on 9/11, recalls: 
We found among other things that there
had been inadequate communication
among the agencies with a responsibility
to alert us to a security threat. The FBI
and the CIA had information which,
had it been brought together, might well
have allowed us to have avoided 9/11.2
The 9/11 Commission reached the same
conclusion. In the words of former Gov. Kean: 
Before 9/11, Congress was not doing
its job of oversight of the intelligence
agencies that were not doing the job
themselves. That was one of the
 lessons of 9/11. This recommendation
[resulted from asking the question],
“How can we make sure that …
Congress is in fact … doing the most
that [it] can to protect [us]?”3
In the nine years since the 9/11
Commission issued its findings, the vast
majority of its recommendations have been
implemented in whole or in part. Not so the
one urging the streamlining of Congressional
oversight of DHS. Since the 9/11 report was
promulgated, independent reports by a
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Streamlining and Consolidating
Congressional Oversight of the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
So long as oversight is governed by current Congressional rules and 
resolutions, we believe that the American people will not get the security
they want and need. 
—9/11 Commission Report
 variety of groups – including the Bipartisan
Policy Center, the Heritage Foundation, the
Brookings Institution, George Washington
University’s Homeland Security Policy
Institute, and the Center for Strategic and
International Studies-Business Executives
for National Security – have underscored the
need for oversight reform. They have charac-
terized the current system as “balkanized
and dysfunctional” (CSIS-BENS, 2004)4,
“jurisdiction … carved up to accommodate
antiquated committee structures” (BPC,
2011),5 “duplicative and wasteful” (HSPI,
2004),6 a “crushing … failure” (Brookings,
2006),7 and “byzantine” (Heritage, 2012).8
To raise awareness of the need for
Congress to respond to this 9/11 Commission
recommendation, The Annenberg Foundation
Trust at Sunnylands and the Justice and
Society Program of the Aspen Institute, in
partnership with the Annenberg Public Policy
Center of the University of Pennsylvania,
 convened a high-level bipartisan Task Force on
Streamlining and Consolidating Congressional
Oversight of the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, in April 2013, at The
Annenberg Retreat at Sunnylands in Rancho
Mirage, Calif. Among its members are 9/11
Commission co-chairs Hamilton and Kean,
former DHS officials under Presidents
Barack Obama and George W. Bush, and
past and present members of Congress (see
Appendix, p. 24).
The task force members examined five
questions:
 Why does Congressional oversight
matter?
 What are the characteristics of an
effective oversight structure?
 How does fragmented oversight affect
the nation’s well-being and security?
 What are the structural and political
barriers to reform?
 What should be done now and when
the new Congress convenes in January 2015?
Drawing on the experience of its
 members as evidence, this report offers the
Sunnylands-Aspen Task Force’s answers.
Why Congressional Oversight Matters
Congress’ job is to look into every nook
and cranny of the executive branch to
see that the laws are being properly
executed, to make suggestions [about]
where improvements can be made. To
understand what the policy of the
executive branch is. To try to be
 constructive and to be a critic as well if
they don’t like what the executive is
doing. If it is properly done, if the right
questions are asked, it can greatly
strengthen the operation of a
 department. … Proper, tough, robust
oversight can put the bureaucracy on
its toes, can make sure that the law is
being implemented, can see that
there’s not a lot of hanky-panky going
on, corruption. And to make sure that
the people are being well served.9
—9/11 Commission co-chair and 
former Rep. Lee H. Hamilton (D., Ind.)
“Properly executed” oversight, as former
DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff notes,
enables members of Congress to better
“understand the department that they’re
 looking at, understand the issues well, ask
sharp and informed questions and get answers
that are helpful in determining whether the
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department or agency is performing most
efficiently.”10 Former Homeland Security
Adviser Kenneth L. Wainstein agrees:
Effective Congressional oversight “enhances
our national security” by helping “to inform
the legislative process. The more Congress
conducts oversight, the more [its members]
understand the workings of the executive
branch, and the better the legislation that
they produce, which assists the executive
branch in its efforts to protect the country.”11
“We oversee to make sure that they’re
doing what we ask them to do — that’s the
law,” observes Rep. Loretta Sanchez (D.,
Calif.), a member of the House Committee
on Homeland Security. “We  oversee them to
know that they’re not spending too much or too
little money in an arena, that there’s no cor-
ruption.”12
“Congressional oversight,” says former
Rep. John Tanner (D., Tenn.), “is probably as
important a  function of Congress as any
other. … It has to do with the wise utilization of
whatever resources come to the government.
And it has to do at the end of the day with the
 confidence level people have … the  confidence
that the government is actually functioning in
a way that makes sense to people.”13
The Characteristics of an Effective
Congressional Oversight Structure
Effective oversight occurs when corresponding
committees in each House hold a department
accountable and use their power to ensure
that it has the authorizations and resources it
requires to accomplish its mission well and in
a way that makes efficient use of tax dollars. 
Congressional oversight is most
 constructive when a Congressional committee
builds expertise and is in a position to see the 
big picture, ensuring that existing legislation
is implemented properly and new legislation
responds to evolving threats. For example,
as Chertoff notes, “Over time the committees
in the defense area in Congress have had
quite a lot of influence on the direction of
defense policy because there’s been a single
focal point in each House for authorizing
what the Department of Defense does.”14
The Constitution, in Article I, Section 9,
provides, in part: “No Money shall be drawn
from the Treasury, but in Consequence of
Appropriations made by Law.” This gives the
Congress the power over federal spending.
This legislative provision is broadly enforced
by laws, such as the Antideficiency Act, that
limit what executive branch officials can do
with the funds given them.
As the size and role of government has
grown, Congress has realized that it needs to
divide policy deliberations from spending.
Both Houses have established separate
authorizing and appropriations committees to
achieve this. Programs and their administration
are to be funded through an annual
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Congressional oversight 
is most constructive when
a Congressional committee
builds expertise and is in 
a position to see the big 
picture, ensuring that
 existing legislation is
 implemented properly and
new legislation responds  
to evolving threats.
 appropriation process, while overseen and
authorized by a separate authorizing
 committee. The Congress exercises its “power
of the purse” through this authorization and
appropriation of funds.
Most executive agencies are chiefly
associated with and scrutinized by a single
legislative committee in each chamber of
Congress. For instance, the operations of the
Department of Labor are principally overseen
in the Senate by the Committee on Health,
Education, Labor & Pensions and in the
House of Representatives by the Committee
on Education & the Workforce. Likewise, these
two committees have the main responsibility
for developing and drafting legislation relating
to the Department of Labor. 
The same is true of most of the other
departments and agencies of the Executive
Branch. The State Department is closely
aligned with the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs and the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations. As the following table
shows, major Cabinet departments correspond
with one or two substantive committees in
each chamber of Congress.
8 Streamlining and Consolidating Congressional Oversight of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Department House Committee Senate Committee
or Agency
Agriculture Agriculture Agriculture,
Nutrition & Forestry
Defense Armed Services/ Armed Services/
Intelligence Intelligence
Education Education & Health, Education, Labor
the Workforce & Pensions
Energy Energy & Commerce Energy & Natural
Resources
Justice Judiciary Judiciary
Labor Education & Health, Education, Labor
the Workforce & Pensions
Director of National Intelligence Intelligence 
Intelligence/CIA
State Foreign Affairs Foreign Relations
Treasury Financial Services/ Finance/Banking, Housing 
Ways and Means and Urban Affairs
Veterans’ Affairs Veterans’ Affairs Veterans’ Affairs
However, when jurisdiction is diffuse —
asserted, in this case, by more than 100
committees and subcommittees, each with a
different mandate — good oversight is
 difficult. As Chertoff, DHS Secretary from
2005 to 2009, said at Sunnylands: 
A fragmented oversight structure
means conflicting direction, maybe
uncertainty about what Congress
wants, and it certainly means a burden
of appearing at hearings or producing
paper for Congress that multiplies in 
a way that actually impedes the
 department’s ability to focus on its
operations.15
The lack of alignment between the House
and Senate committees claiming jurisdiction
is problematic as well. Currently, the Senate
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Committee has less oversight of  homeland
security than its counterpart, the House
Committee on Homeland Security. Caryn
Wagner, who worked both on the House
Permanent Select Committee for Intelligence
and for DHS as Under Secretary for
Intelligence and Analysis, explains the difficulty
created when House and Senate committee
jurisdiction does not match up: 
The House passes a bill and the
Senate passes a bill. Then they get
together in conference and come up
with one bill that ideally the president
signs into law. If you don’t have
 jurisdiction over the same elements,
it’s really impossible to conference a
 comprehensive bill.16
How Fragmented Oversight Affects
the Nation’s Well-Being and Security
The current state of DHS oversight hampers
the department’s functioning in three primary
ways: redundant requests from committees
drain valuable resources; the overlap of
 legislative roles complicates Congressional
oversight and results in less Congressional
control; and that same fragmentation prevents
Congress from addressing pressing concerns
in a timely fashion.
1. A Drain on Resources
Forcing people who should be doing
their jobs securing our homeland to
spend more of their time reporting to
Congress than doing their job is wrong.17
—Former Rep. and House Rules
Committee chair David Dreier (R., Calif.)
The complications created by fragmented
oversight were on vivid display in November
2012 when a DHS official decided not to  
 fulfill a request to testify before a
Congressional committee. As Administrator
of the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA), a part of DHS, John S. Pistole
 oversees a 61,000-person workforce, the
security of more than 450 U.S. airports, and
the Federal Air Marshal Service, as well as
highway, railroad, port, mass-transit and
pipeline security throughout the nation. In
late 2012, he drew attention to the issue of
divided oversight when he declined a request
by the House Subcommittee on Aviation to
testify on passenger policies on the grounds
that the panel lacked jurisdiction over the TSA.
At that time, Pistole said the TSA would
continue to work with its committees of
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 jurisdiction to pursue effective security
 solutions. What appeared to the TSA to be a
measured response to a redundant demand
was taken by the subcommittee as a symbolic
finger in the eye. While conceding that the sub-
committee does not have “direct jurisdiction,”
Rep. Bill Shuster (R., Pa.), the incoming chair,
observed of the TSA, “When they impede the
traveling public, they need to answer to the
committee.”18 Although the TSA head
 challenged the subcommittee’s jurisdiction,
the Homeland Security Department’s Inspector
General’s office tacitly granted it by accepting
an invitation to testify at the same hearing.19
In the 112th Congress (2011-2013), TSA
personnel testified at 38 hearings and provided
425 briefings for members of Congress,
numbers consistent with the worry expressed
in 2010 by then-Homeland Security Secretary
Janet Napolitano that:
Our principals and their staff [are]
spending more time responding to
Congressional requests and require-
ments than executing their mandated
homeland security responsibilities.20
Every request for a briefing or invitation
to attend a hearing requires a commitment of
resources. By one estimate, no other agency
spends as much time on Capitol Hill as DHS.
In 2007 and 2008, for example, officials at
the Department of Veterans Affairs, a depart-
ment of comparable budget and size to DHS,
testified at half the number of hearings
before just two committees, and gave less
than one-tenth as many briefings as DHS.21
By contrast, Congress recently brought DHS
officials before five committees for almost a
dozen hearings on cybersecurity issues in
less than a year, requesting answers to
dozens of redundant questions on network
protection.22 Nonetheless, Congress has been
unable to pass a comprehensive cybersecurity
bill.
“When you have different Congressional
committees all asking questions or conducting
oversight into the same areas of an agency’s
operations,” Wainstein says, “that means
that their officials … who are responsible for,
in the case of DHS, protecting the homeland
[are] spending hours responding to redundant
questions. … That’s time that they’re not
 committing to protecting the nation.”23
In the 112th Congress, more than 100
Congressional committees and subcommittees
asserted jurisdiction over DHS (compared
with the 36 committees and subcommittees
that oversee the Department of Defense,
which has a budget 10 times greater and
 millions more employees). DHS personnel
participated in 289 formal House and Senate
hearings, involving 28 committees, caucuses
and  commissions, which required testimony
from more than 400 DHS witnesses. The
department also participated in more than
4,300 briefings and other non-hearing
engagements with Congress.24
10 Streamlining and Consolidating Congressional Oversight of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Every request for a 
briefing or invitation to
attend a DHS hearing
requires a commitment 
of resources. By one 
estimate, no other agency
spends as much time on
Capitol Hill as DHS.
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Think of having 100 bosses. Think of
reporting to 100 people. It makes no
sense. You could not do your job under
those circumstances.25
—9/11 Commission co-chair and
 former New Jersey Gov. Tom Kean
Three buzzwords used in Washington
are “accountability,” “disclosure,” and 
“transparency.” Those three words are
thrown out all the time. If you look at
the notion of the people at the
Department of Homeland Security being
accountable, the difficult thing here is,
to whom are they accountable?26
—David Dreier
These numbers understate the time
commitment required to respond effectively.
Drafting testimony for each hearing typically
requires the work of two or three subject
 matter experts. The Office of Legislative
Affairs and the general counsel must review
the  prepared remarks. Depending on the
issue, senior managers may need to approve
the substantive content of the testimony. One
or more preparation  sessions are required.
And after the hearing there typically will be a
series of questions for the record, for which
responses must be drafted. One estimate
suggests that each hearing requires 
one month’s worth of  person-hours of
 preparation.27 In 2009 alone, DHS spent
roughly 66 work-years responding to
 questions from Congress, at a cost to
 taxpayers of $10 million.28
Rep. Lamar Smith (R., Texas), chair of
the House Judiciary Committee, which
 oversees part of DHS, asserted in 2011 that
Congress meant to create a “purposeful
redundancy” with its oversight.29 But as Kean
noted in a recent interview, “You can’t have
oversight with over 90 committees … [and]
it’s gotten worse, not better. And so in that
area, it continues to be dysfunctional. And
everybody knows it.”30
So, for example, in the House the
Transportation Committee, which used
to have the Coast Guard and FEMA
under its supervision, will continue to
try to insert itself into supervising those
parts of the Department of Homeland
Security, even though there actually is
a Homeland Security Committee that’s
supposed to look at the whole
 department. As a consequence it’s a
little bit like childhood soccer games.
Everybody runs after the ball, and they
wind up colliding into each other.31
—Former Homeland Security
Secretary Michael Chertoff
2. Diminished Congressional Influence
The fractured system of Congressional
 oversight makes it difficult for Congress to
enact substantive legislation guiding DHS.
Emblematic of this difficulty: In the 10 years
since it was established, DHS has never had
a comprehensive authorization bill. Such
 legislation, routine for comparable agencies
such as the Department of Defense, is the
forum in which Congress sets its priorities
and offers comprehensive policy direction to
a department, while providing it with the
 legislation necessary to effectively perform
its daily operations. In the absence of such 
a bill, most DHS policy is made through 
the already overextended appropriations
 committees (a process that severely diminishes
the Congressional “imprint” on DHS),
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through piecemeal authorizations such as
the SAFE Port Act, or through executive
interpretation of statute.
“The authorizing legislation is the
 primary means by which the Congress tells
the executive branch what it wants done,”
Hamilton notes.32 “They write it into law in the
authorization law. Totally absent in the
Department of Homeland Security. There’s
never been an authorization bill. Why not?
Because responsibility is so fragmented
 within the House and the Senate that they
can’t get a bill out. … What this means is that
the power of the Congress is sharply
 diminished. And it shifts over to the executive
branch because they don’t have any
 guidance … from Congress.”
To get an authorization bill [for the
Coast Guard] requires that bill to be
sent to a lot of committees because
they have jurisdiction over portions of
the bill. … In my four years as
 commandant of the Coast Guard, I did
not get an authorization bill in any year.
So every year I was appropriated
money. But to the extent that there
were changes in law needed for how
we deal with oil spill response, the
safety of vessels, these kinds of things,
there was no vehicle by which to make
those policy changes or seek changes
in those laws for four years.33
—Thad Allen, retired Admiral and
23rd Coast Guard Commandant
While DHS is not the only department
hampered by the recent trend toward operating
through appropriation and continuing
 resolutions, the negative effect of this lack of
guidance on a relatively new department is 
more severe. In the words of Caryn Wagner,
DHS Under Secretary for Intelligence and
Analysis during President Obama’s first term,
“The lack of an effective authorization
process for the Department headquarters
compounds the difficulties of the Department
in maturing its foundational business processes
and in properly structuring and resourcing itself
to achieve the type of synergy envisioned when
the Department was created.”
Moreover, the messages regarding
homeland security that come out of
Congress sometimes appear to conflict or
are drowned out altogether. With so many
Congressional voices dictating to DHS, there
is little cost to the department in ignoring the
messages that it dislikes or the policies it
wishes not to implement. As Chertoff puts it:
“When many voices speak, it’s like no voice
speaks.”34
The [DHS] winds up getting a mixed
message. … So either the department
has no guidance or, more likely, the
department ignores both because
they’re in conflict. And so the depart-
ment does what it wants to do.35
—Michael Chertoff
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The fractured system of
Congressional oversight
makes it difficult for
Congress to enact
 substantive legislation 
guiding the Department 
of Homeland Security.
Among the problematic results is a
reduced rather than enhanced Congressional
role in protecting the homeland. So, for
example, a 2012 study examining the degree
of influence that Congress has over policy in
various federal departments and agencies
found an inverse correlation between the
number of committees exercising oversight
of an agency and Congressional influence on
policy matters. Indeed, looking at DHS, the
study said that the “108 committees and sub-
committees overseeing the Department of
Homeland Security may provide members
with access to DHS resources but also affect
the ability of Congress to compete with
 presidential influence over the general direction
of agency policy. Members overly focused on
securing district resources … may be unwilling
or unable to focus on the larger policy goals.”36
Proceeding hand-in-hand with the
 proliferation of oversight committees has
been a decline in interest in serving on the
House Committee on Homeland Security. In the
immediate aftermath of 9/11, the magnitude
of that tragedy elicited a strong desire to
serve on the Committee in order to enhance
the nation’s security and resilience. As the
memories of 9/11 have dimmed and no
 comparable attack has occurred, interest in
serving has waned. 
In the beginning, the committee actually
was populated with some of the
 appropriators and some of the
 chairmen or more senior members of
other committees that would have a
vested interest in making homeland
security a real being in the Congress.
But after a while it became pretty
apparent that those chairmen were not
really interested in vesting the real
meat of some of the problems in over-
sight issues in the committee, and so
soon they fell off of the committee.
They decided they didn’t want to be on
it any longer, and it became populated
by people with less seniority, and today
has many, many freshmen on it.37
—Rep. Loretta Sanchez (D., Calif.),
Homeland Security Committee member
The erosion of interest in serving on the
Committee has been accompanied by a decline
in the age, homeland-security experience, and
influence of its members, and thus in the
 influence of the Committee itself. In the process,
overall Congressional participation in DHS
 oversight has — at least in part — degenerated
into turf battles, as indicated by the cases of
 biological and cybersecurity threats and
 unregulated vehicles noted below. Moreover,
where other departments and agencies enjoy
the benefits of having a champion on their
 primary committee, DHS does not. 
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The erosion of interest in
serving on the Committee
has been accompanied 
by a decline in the age, 
homeland-security 
experience, and influence
of its members, and thus 
in the influence of the
Committee itself.
3. Delayed Response to Pressing
Concerns
In a fragmented structure, no one committee
is tasked with — and as a result accountable
for – seeing the big picture. At the same time,
getting legislation passed is complicated by
competing demands from multiple committees
and by a process that is filled with opportunities
for intervention by those whose interests are
not served by passage of the bill. Routine
pieces of legislation that would enable the
Department to function more effectively can take
months to go through multiple committees with
differing agendas, and may never be enacted.
I believe that the worst thing that
 happens by not concentrating oversight
into a committee like the Homeland
Security Committee is that everybody
knows a little bit but nobody is really
 taking a look at the overall picture. And
that’s very dangerous because that’s
how things fall between the cracks.38
—Rep. Loretta Sanchez 
The Homeland Security Act was
 successful in creating a single
 subcommittee on appropriations for
homeland security. But the act …  
didn’t resolve overlapping jurisdictions,
gaps in jurisdictions [on the authorizing
structure]. One of the things at the 10th
anniversary of DHS that’s sorely needed
is a baseline evaluation of all those
statutes that were merely  aggregated
against what we think Homeland Security
ought to be 10 years later. And it’s hard
to do that with the current oversight
 structure with multiple committees.39
—Thad Allen
During the retreat at Sunnylands, task
force members identified vulnerabilities that
highlight the need to consolidate oversight as
soon as possible: unregulated small aircraft
and boats, cybersecurity, and biological
threats.
Unregulated Small Vehicles
Suppose I’ve got a small plane coming
into Teterboro. I walk out to the airport
and get into the plane. I don’t go
through any screening. The same
problem occurs with boats. We have to
get control of our air space and our
waterways to make sure nothing that
could harm us comes in by that
method.40
—Tom Kean
Task force members voiced concern that
DHS and Congress have not done enough to
protect against the prospect that small,
 general aviation aircraft and unregulated sea
vessels will transport weapons of mass
destruction into the United States, be used
as weapons themselves (as were the planes
on 9/11), or will transport individuals into the
country intent on doing it harm. Admiral Thad
Allen said that he spent years attempting to
advance draft legislation on small-vessel
security: 
What size vessel should carry an
 identification device [of the sort]
required on aircraft? Should there be
licensing so you know who’s operating
a boat? Should there be areas where
small boats shouldn’t operate because
of the vulnerable infrastructure that’s in
the area? … If you try to come up with
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a framework to deal with unregulated
small boats and the vulnerabilities that
exist there, and you look at the number
of committees that would have to be
involved, it becomes very, very hard.
And frankly there hasn’t been an
appetite to take this on.41
Cybersecurity
“A lot of our national leaders — military
leaders, leaders of our intelligence agencies
— think that one of the great growing threats
to American security are these cyberattacks,”
notes former Rep. Howard Berman (D., Calif.).
Meanwhile, efforts to combat cyberthreats,
including those  originating from countries
such as China and Iran, have been caught
up in disputes over whether DHS or the
National Security Agency has authority. Task
force members fear that divided jurisdiction
over this  complex issue has made it more
 difficult for the nation to respond effectively to
a major cyberattack, with one participant
pressing for much greater attention to the
 difficulties of managing the nation’s “virtual
border in a global commons.”42
The Armed Services Committee has
thoughts about the subject [of cyber-
security]. The Homeland Security
Committee thinks this is about making
the homeland more secure. … So it is
harder to get a consensus. It’s harder
to give the authority to the Executive
Branch to create the defense than it
might otherwise be. That’s a problem.43
—Former Rep. and Foreign Affairs
Committee chair Howard Berman
(D., Calif.)
The cyberthreat is a big threat to this
country. Congress can’t pass a bill on
it. They’ve worked at it for years.
They’ve not been able to agree
between the House and Senate. …
What that means is that the House and
Senate – the Congress, if you will — is
deferring power to the president. The
president writes an executive order. An
executive order is not as good as a
piece of legislation. It pertains to the
executive branch. So there are limitations
to that.44
—Lee Hamilton
Cybersecurity is not an issue about
partisanship because many of the
 proposed bills have had bipartisan
support. It’s really an issue of so many
different committees that all have their
particular interest and they can’t get
together with a coherent plan to pass a
law to help protect the United States
against very real cyberthreats.45
—Arif Alikhan, deputy executive
director for law enforcement and
homeland security, Los Angeles World
Airports
Attempts to clarify oversight have been
frustrated. In 2005, for instance, a plan to
give jurisdiction over cybersecurity to the
House Homeland Security Committee was
met by protests from the Energy & Commerce
Committee, and the matter was dropped.46
The seven Congressional committees that
claim some jurisdiction over cybersecurity
issues often clash, producing bills that
 conflict with one another by vesting jurisdiction
in favored agencies within and outside DHS.
The result: Bills are reported out of commit-
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tee but fail to secure the needed votes on the
House or Senate floor, or are so watered
down that they fail to address the threat.
For example, in 2012 the House
Homeland Security Committee’s Promoting
and Enhancing Cybersecurity and Information
Sharing Effectiveness Act sought to give
cybersecurity regulatory authority to DHS.
But it competed with the House Intelligence
Committee’s Cyber Intelligence Sharing and
Protection Act, the House Oversight and
Government Reform Committee’s Federal
Information Security Amendments, and the
House Committee on Science, Space &
Technology’s Cybersecurity Enhancement
Act – all of which put the authority elsewhere.47
None got the traction to pass both houses of
Congress.
In April 2013, for the second year in a row,
the House passed the Cyber Intelligence
Sharing and Protection Act. But the Senate
has refused to vote on the measure.
Senators now are reportedly drafting bills in
at least three committees: Homeland Security,
Commerce, and Intelligence.48
Biological Threats
The need for a more systematic
approach to bio-threats was voiced at the
retreat by retired Sen. Bob Graham (D., Fla.),
former co-chair of the Congressionally
 mandated Commission on the Prevention of
Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation
and Terrorism, who said: 
Unless the Congress is in a position to
look at an issue like biological attacks
in a strategic way and not just focus on
the one piece of the problem that may
be within the jurisdiction of a particular
committee, you’re not likely to get it
right, and the American people are
therefore more vulnerable to what the
WMD Commission found to be the most
likely weapon of mass destruction to be
used.49
We haven’t been able to get Congress
to act because the responsibility for
setting priorities for biological mechanisms
is scattered in several committees and
they have disagreed as to which federal
agencies should have the ultimate
responsibility for making these priority
decisions and about how these
 decisions should be made. … If the
committee is responsible for, say, the
Centers for Disease Control, it would
like the responsibility to be in the
Centers for Disease Control because
then it would have oversight of it.50
Though experts say that only a dozen or
so deserve close scrutiny, the federal
 government maintains a list of 75 biological
threats. Legislation recently introduced to
 prioritize those threats failed to pass. One of
the primary reasons was disagreement over
which agency will retain control. “We’ve been
trying,” Graham noted, “…to redo this list and
have those 12 or so that are the major
threats put in a category where they will get
the highest level of attention and security. …
We haven’t been able to do that because the
Congress has the jurisdiction of the
Department of Homeland Security in one
committee and the jurisdiction of the
Department of Health and Human Services
in another, and they haven’t been able to decide
which executive agency should have the
responsibility for managing this new list.”51
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Structural and Political Barriers 
to Reform
Despite the advantages that would accrue to
the nation, task force members and other
experts have noted roadblocks to consolidating
and streamlining DHS oversight. Chief among
them: strong resistance from the chairs of
committees who would lose some of their
power were oversight to be streamlined and
the challenge of capturing the media’s
 attention and the public’s imagination with an
issue that at first glance appears remote from
most people’s lives. 
Those seeking to reform oversight must
take into account the political realities that
undergird the jurisdictional structure. Service
as chair of the House Committee on
Homeland Security or the Senate Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
is unlikely to carry electoral payoffs, since
enhancements to public safety are most
often experienced at the national level rather
than as specific benefits to a district or state.
Moreover, if oversight reform is implemented,
some existing committee chairs will lose
some power and turf. 
Members of Congress have tried to
keep as much of the power that they
had historically through this concept of
legacy jurisdiction over the agencies
even though the agencies have
 technically been moved under another
committee.52
—Bob Graham
One of the things I concluded 20 years
ago was that members of Congress
would just as soon give up their first-
born [as] give up jurisdiction over the
executive branch in particular areas.53
—David Dreier
All of this suggests that the most
 promising strategy for reform lies in convincing
Congressional leadership that it is the right
thing to do. Only a leadership convinced of
the benefits to the country is likely to make
such oversight reform happen. 
Finally, the issue of Congressional
 oversight has long been seen as an “inside-
the-Beltway” problem, one hidden beneath
 layers of procedure and mundane logistics.
As a result, even though Congress’ failure to
act may jeopardize the safety and security of
the country, it has been difficult to mobilize
public interest in remedying the problem.
Former Rep. Dan Glickman (D., Kan.),
 executive director of the Aspen Institute’s
Congressional program, recently observed
that the American people are most
 concerned with issues that affect their day-
to-day lives, and that is why more people
have an opinion about the TSA than about
most other DHS component agencies. 
Americans encounter DHS’ FEMA in times
of disaster, its Customs and Border Protection
during international travel, and its Coast
Guard employees in coastal communities and
at sea. Yet a decade after DHS was formed,
most Americans still don’t understand the
department’s “all  hazards” mission, or how all
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Americans should not settle for incremental, ad hoc adjustments to a system
designed generations ago for a world that no longer exists. 
—9/11 Commission Report
its components fit together. As a result, 
the  public is unlikely to tell members of
Congress that they ought to reform the
oversight structure of DHS. And an issue
involving oversight is, admittedly, a distinctly
unsexy topic, far less likely than  others to
 capture media attention.
What Should Be Done Now and
When the New Congress Convenes
in January 2015
To meet the ongoing security challenges our
country faces, the task force recommends
specific actions by the executive and legislative
branches, as well as a role for the media:
1. Congress
Fragmented oversight, the task force
concluded, increases security risks for the
United States by reducing the coherence of
our national focus on prevention, protection
and planning at a time when more needs to
be done. Under the current arrangement,
retired Coast Guard Admiral and task force
member Thad Allen said, Congress all too
often “engages in random acts of after-sight.”
Consistent with the 9/11 Commission’s
recommendation, this report has argued:
To ensure that the oversight process
works efficiently, Congress should
 significantly reduce the number of
committees with jurisdiction over
homeland security and consolidate
 primary oversight of the key DHS
 component agencies under one
 committee in the House and one in the
Senate, with coordinated jurisdiction. 
Task force members were united in the
conviction that:
Consolidating Congressional oversight
of DHS would enhance accountability. 
If it is to function effectively, such over-
sight should be consistent with that of
Cabinet departments that bear similar
levels and kinds of responsibility for
the safety and resilience of Americans
in the face of both man-made and
 natural threats and disasters.
The task force believes that the oversight
process in both houses should be significantly
streamlined and the Senate and House
 oversight structures aligned with each other
to the extent possible. 
The task force noted that previous studies
agree that streamlined Congressional
 oversight of DHS would benefit the nation.
Their reform proposals include separating
the supervision of DHS’ immigration and
homeland security roles and retaining the
main oversight committees while canceling
the jurisdiction of other Congressional
 committees considered redundant.
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This task force believes that Congress is
best positioned to decide which structure
best satisfies the 9/11 Commission’s goal.
But it recommends that any structure be
 consistent with the following principles:
 The oversight structure for DHS
should resemble the one governing
other critical departments, such as the
departments of Defense and Justice.
 Congress should align the
 jurisdictional oversight of the House
and Senate committees to the greatest
extent possible.
 Committees claiming common
 jurisdiction should have some over -
lapping membership to encourage the
sharing of information and curtail
redundant requests.
The consolidation and simplification of
oversight depends largely upon Congressional
leadership. The best chance for major reform
comes during reorganization at the beginning
of a new Congress. In the meantime, there
are ways that Congress can enhance the
effectiveness of oversight without requiring
committees to relinquish jurisdiction. For
instance, it can pass authorizing legislation
and ensure expedited action by imposing
time limits on committee referrals. 
Pass Authorizing Legislation The need
to pass authorizing legislation extends
beyond DHS. By some estimates the
country is operating with approximately
$400 billion of spending unauthorized
annually. As this report contends,
passing authorizations improves
Congressional oversight and prioritizes
programs within DHS. When large
segments of the Department of
Homeland Security operate with
“unauthorized appropriations,” the
administration is able to set its priorities
unguided by Congress and might not
be spending money on programs that
Congress considers important. 
Limit the Time for Action When a bill
comes under the jurisdiction of multiple
committees that ask to review it in
sequence after the primary committee
acts, the process is all but stopped
awaiting committee action unless there
is a  time limit on the referrals. Time
may run out with nothing enacted. The
task force believes that Congress
should limit the time for action of
sequential referrals to another committee,
ensuring that if committees fail to act
on what has been sent to them within
a set period of time their jurisdiction
would lapse, with the matter returning
to the primary committee.
2. The Executive
The White House could increase the
 likelihood that pressing issues move onto the
national and Congressional agenda by creating
a more robust role for the Homeland Security
Adviser, and by placing the Secretary of
Homeland Security on the National Security
Council.
3. Media and Public Information
If Kean is correct that Congress is unlikely
to reform itself, then reform must be jump-
 started by external demand. As shown by the
country’s experience with the Boston
Marathon bombing, recent ricin threats against
public officials, and natural disasters from
Hurricane Sandy to the May 2013 Oklahoma
tornado, the fourth estate has a vital role to
play in informing the public about national
security concerns, and the nation’s editorial
pages have the capacity to increase the  
likelihood that Congress will see the wisdom
of implementing this important recommendation
of the 9/11 Commission Report.
The Bottom Line
In sum, while reform of Congressional
 oversight can’t make the nation 100 percent
safe, it is a key component of any national
effort to manage evolving threats. We close
with the words of two task force members:
We have a really important issue. How
do we keep America secure? And we
have a structure in the Congress that
makes it harder to maintain that focus
on that very important issue. And that’s
not good.54
—Howard Berman
If the [oversight] recommendation of
the 9/11 Commission on Homeland
Security is put into law and becomes
effective, the American people in their
pursuit of their daily lives will be
safer.55
—Lee Hamilton
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career in the U.S. Coast Guard as its 23rd
commandant. Prior to that assignment, Allen
served as Coast Guard chief of staff. During
his tenure in that post, in 2005, he was
 designated principal federal official for the
U.S. government’s response and recovery
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of the Sandra Day O’Connor Project on the
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Foreign Affairs Committee and the Ways &
Means Committee. He also served on the
House Armed Services and House Science
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Caryn Wagner served as Under Secretary for
Intelligence and Analysis in the Department
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review team of the Obama-Biden Transition
Project. She retired from federal service from
the House Permanent Select Committee on
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the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence as an assistant deputy director of
National Intelligence for Management and was
the first chief financial officer for the National
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Kenneth L. Wainstein is co-chair of the
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